Abstract. In general, diagrams and text are both considered to have their advantages and disadvantages for the representation of use case models, but this is rarely investigated experimentally. This paper describes a controlled experiment where we compare safety hazard identification by means of misuse cases based on use case diagrams and textual use cases. The experiment participants found use case diagrams and textual use cases equally easy to use. In most cases those who used textual use cases were able to identify more failure modes or threats. The main reason for this seems to be that use cases encourage analysts to specifically focus on threats related to the functions mentioned in the use case, and textual use cases include more functional details than diagrams. The focus is decided by information in each use case which will thus decide the number of threats identified.
Introduction
There is an increased use of IT both in infrastructure and in work support tools in almost every part of society. This also means that there are increasing safety hazards from failures related to the systems and to the humans that are using them. Accidents related to IT systems tend to stem more from requirements defects than from coding errors [1] . Mainstream software developers often lack safety expertise and may be unable to apply formal, heavyweight methods [2] , and such methods will be even more difficult to apply in collaboration with users and other stakeholders lacking technical expertise. The involvement of these stakeholders is crucial in safety analysis, as social and technical aspects need to be considered together [3] . Better integration of formal and informal methods is one way ahead for the engineering of safe software systems [4] , and similarly better integration between safety engineering and mainstream software engineering can ensure the joint participation of a wider group of stakeholders.
One technique which has been proposed to accommodate safety concerns into mainstream software engineering, is misuse cases [5] . The technique was originally proposed to capture security threats, but has also been investigated with respect to safety-related problems, for instance in [6, 7, 8] . In [9] a comparison was made between misuse cases and an adapted version of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) [10] , starting with use case diagrams as the input. A controlled experiment was set up where participants worked on the same task, one group using misuse case diagrams, the other group using an adapted version of FMEA where failure modes would be identified per use case. The subjects that used misuse case diagrams found significantly more safety hazards than those who used FMEA. This was especially the case for hazards resulting from human error, while the results were roughly equal for technical errors. For some types of technical errors, like network outages, FMEA outperformed misuse cases.
The misuse case group in the experiment in [9] used only misuse case diagrams. It is therefore interesting to also investigate the number of hazards identified when using textual misuse cases. Hence, a new experiment was set up to perform a controlled comparison of textual misuse cases and misuse case diagrams.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 presents the two techniques compared in the experiment. Section 4 presents the experimental design, and section 5 presents the results from the experiment. Section 6 discusses threats to validity, whereupon section 7 concludes the paper and indicates some directions for future work.
Related work
To our knowledge, there are no previous experiments comparing textual / tabular (mis)use cases and (mis)use case diagrams, neither with the purpose of finding threats to a system nor more generally. Indeed, there are few controlled experiments about use cases to be found in the literature at all; for instance [11, 12, 13] which are concerned with guidelines for writing good use cases, [14] looking at the transition from use cases to class diagrams, and [15, 16, 17] investigating inspection of use cases. Looking at conceptual modeling more generally, there are experiments comparing the effectiveness of representation languages, for instance ER or EER diagrams with relational tuples, one well known example being [18] . However, one important point to note here is that the two forms of representation then compared contained the same information but were on different life-cycle levels, ER being an analysis stage language, while relational tuples belong to the design stage. The relationship between use case diagrams and textual use cases is different: both are requirements stage representations but the textual descriptions contain more information than the diagrams.
An experiment more directly targeting the comparison of diagrams versus tables and textual representations is [19] , confirming claims about advantages of diagrams previously made analytically in [20] . Experiments have also found diagrams superior for presenting procedural instructions [21] , which is closely related to conceptual modeling. More generally, the empirical evidence is not so consistently in favor of diagrams. As reported in [22] , some experimental studies have shown advantages for diagrams, but others have shown advantages for tables, or given mixed results. One particular study also showed the outcome to be dependant on the subject group, business students solving problems more effectively with tables while engineering students solved problems more effectively with graphs [23] .
Use case diagrams and textual use cases

Misuse case diagrams
Misuse cases [5] were originally proposed for eliciting security requirements, but they have also been used for safety analysis, misuse cases then being accidents causing harm to the system [6] . The diagram of Fig. 1 shows the human operator functions related to an automated system used to keep the water level in a tank constant while delivering steam to an industrial process. This is done by filling the tank through one valve and emptying it through another valve when needed. If the pressure in the tank becomes too high, a relief valve should open automatically as the pressure exceeds the critical pressure pre-set by the operator. The operator may also manually empty the tank, for instance if the relief valve fails to work when the pressure becomes too high, or manually fill the tank if the automatic adjustment of water level does not work. A misuse case such as "Set too high pressure" may have a "threatens" relationship to one or more use cases -in this case "Set critical pressure". It is also possible that one misuse case may "aggravate" the effect of another, or that a use case may have a "mitigates" relationship to that misuse case. Such relationships are not exemplified in Figure 1 . An essential idea of misuse case analysis is that the representation format causes only a limited overhead if use cases are already applied in a project, which is often the case in mainstream software projects. Moreover, the informality and simplicity of the technique makes it suitable for supporting brainstorming about threats at an early stage of development. For a more complete coverage of misuse case analysis, the reader is referred to [5] and [7] .
Textual misuse cases
Use cases [24] were originally most focussed on text, and the textual representation of a use case gives more detailed information than its diagrammatic counterpart [25] . The textual representation may make it possible to investigate threats in more detail, i.e., on the level of single use case steps instead of just looking at the entire use cases. On the other hand, since the textual use case splits up the functional requirements into a set of disjoint descriptions, it removes the possibility of seeing all functions together to get the complete picture. In addition, we remove the possibility of adding a threat to a use case by just adding a line from a previously identified threat.
There are several ways of writing textual use cases. A most basic distinction in format is between the original single-column style and the two-column style first proposed by [26] , where the left column shows the user actions and the right column the system response. Similarly, textual misuse cases could also be written singlecolumn or with 3 or 4 columns -adding a column for threats and possibly also one for mitigation options to those threats [5] . One example is shown in Table 1 . Again, this example is not meant to be complete, as there may be several other threats involved even in this simple use case as well as several possible mitigations in addition to the ones suggested here. The main point is to illustrate the usage of the technique, not to present a complete safety analysis of the example system. 
Research approach
The two primary research questions for the experiment comparing textual misuse cases and misuse case diagrams were:  RQ1 -will one technique identify more safety hazards than the other technique?
If the answer is yes -is this technique uniformly better, i.e., outperforming the other one for all types of safety hazards? This will be investigated looking at the participants' answers to the modeling task provided in the experiment.  RQ2 -is one of the techniques perceived as being better than the other one by the experiment participants? This question will be investigated by a post-task questionnaire eliciting participant opinion about the technique just tried.
RQ1 concerns the performance of the participants -do they perform better with one technique, or are the techniques equally effective? RQ2 concerns the perception of the participants -do they have a more positive opinion about one technique than the other? The null hypotheses for the experiment were as follows:  H1 0 : There will be no significant difference in the number of safety hazards identified by the two techniques.  H2 0 : There will be no significant difference in the participant opinion about the two techniques.
It seems reasonable to use hypotheses of no difference as a starting point here, rather than hypotheses going in one particular direction, as it could be quite uncertain what to expect. Some arguments point in favor of textual (mis)use cases:
 Textual use cases give more details than use case diagrams, e.g., including action paths within the use cases where the diagrams just give the use case name. There may be safety hazards related to almost every step in a use case, hence the textual variety might trigger ideas about hazards that would ignored with just a diagram as input.  Just writing text may be quicker than drawing diagrams, as there is less need to worry about layout.
On the other hand, there are also arguments in favor of misuse case diagrams:  In some cases, diagrams are more expressive than text [27] . Especially, when one threat is relevant in several places, the diagram makes it possible to draw it just as one node -e.g., "Select wrong patient" in a healthcare information system, and then draw a "threatens" arrow to each use case where this threat might be relevant (e.g., "Review treatment plan", "Review drug dosage", "Schedule patient for surgery", "Order test"). With textual use cases, on the other hand, the threat of selecting the wrong patient would have to be repeated in all the relevant tables.  It could also be imagined that the increased detail of textual tables could be a disadvantage, making the analysts too focused on hazards directly related to the suggested action path, while possibly ignoring other hazards which could be imagined with the less detailed diagrams as input. In general, diagrams are sometimes considered more appealing to creativity than text or tables [28] .
The data analysis for RQ1 consists of two steps (1) categorizing the failure modes into a common set for both methods and (2) use t-tests to compare the two data setsone for the total number of failure modes identified from each method and one for the number of failure modes identified in each of the three categories primary user, system, and secondary user.
The data analysis for RQ2 is done by using the t-test on the coded scores in the usual way -using a Likert scale where strongly disagree to strongly agree is coded as 1 to 5. The questions used to answer RQ2 were based on the TAM model [29] .
We have observed that there are purists who do not like to use the t-test on Likert scale data, but we are not going to repeat this discussion. Instead the reader is referred to [30] where this discussion is summed up and, hopefully, brought to an end.
Experiment design
All the students participating in the experiment had finished a fourth semester course in software engineering based on UML. They were randomly divided into two groups, one using TMUC (Textual MisUse Case) for the analysis task and the other using DMUC (Diagram MisUse Case). Both groups solved their tasks under equal conditions -same room, same time-frame. The experiment consisted of four steps: (1) studying the four page tutorial describing the respective methods, (2) filling in the pre-experiment questionnaire, (3) performing a DMUC or TMUC analysis, with the help of the tutorial, and (4) filling in the post-experiment questionnaire. We allocated 20 minutes for studying the tutorial and completing the pre-experiment questionnaire, 50 minutes for doing the analysis and 10 minutes for completing the post-experiment questionnaire. The students were instructed to identify as many failure modes as possible. A failure mode was defined as any system event that could threaten the wellbeing of one or more patients. Based on our own observations, no group seemed to have problems with finishing their tasks within the allocated time frame. The use case diagram to be analyzed stems from a system for electronic patient journals and is shown in Figure 2 . The doctor has five functions -he can review (i.e., read and update) the patient's treatment plan, the patient's drug data, the diagnosis and other documents, and order tests from the lab. The lab performs tests and sends test results back to the doctor.
The textual use cases for this experiment were constructed based on a pattern suggested by Heldal [31] as indicated in Figure 3 . The most important concept of this pattern is that it will help the developer to focus on the two core activities (1) validate the input and (2) change the state based on this input. An example of a textual uses case used in the experiment is shown in Table 2 . The use case names and actor names are the same as the ones used in the use case diagrams. The textual use cases will have one important advantage over the use case diagrams: they contain more information. This will hold true for all textual use cases when compared to use case diagrams. It will, a fortiori, hold in our case, where the selected textual use case pattern force us to include input checks -see steps 2 and 3 in the textual use case of Table 2 . 
Identified failure modes
In order to compare the two methods we looked at two sets of differences: (1) the difference between the total number of failure modes and (2) the difference for each actor -doctor, lab and computer system. The results turned out as follows:  The total system. TMUC found significantly more defects than DMUC -11.6 vs. 10.7. p = 0.01 and the effect size is 0.7. Thus, we will reject hypothesis H1 0 . The total number of failure modes was 33.  The doctor. No difference in the number of failure modes identified  The computer system. TMUC found significantly more failure modes than DMUC -4.1 vs. 2.5 with a p-value of 0.01 and an effect size of 0.7. The total number of computer system failure modes was 12.  The lab. No difference in the number of failure modes identified.
In all cases the participants in the experiment on the average found approximately one third of the possible failure modes -6 out of 15 for the doctor use cases, 4 out of 12 for the system and 2 out of 6 for the lab use case. As should be expected, some failure modes were identified by more participants than others.
In order to study the causes of the differences between DMUC and TMUC, we used a detailed plot of the threats identified for the computer system. This plot is shown in Figure 4 . The plot shows the fraction of the participants that identified each failure mode. This fraction can be interpreted as the probability of identifying a failure mode, using either DMUC or TMUC. T31 T32 T33 T34 T35 T50 T51 T52 T53 T54 T55 T56 Textual usecases TMUC Use case diagrams DMUC Fig. 4 . The probability of identifying each failure mode Even though the fraction of persons that identified each failure mode in the computer system is larger for TMUC than for DMUC in most of the cases, the differences are more outspoken for the failure modes in the second part of the list, e.g. T51 -"data not available", T52 -"data is lost" and T54 -"incorrect error message".
The differences between the portions of persons that identified each failure mode using TMUC and DMUC respectively for the unlucky doctor and for the faulty system are shown in fig 5 and fig 6. - T11 T12 T13 T14 T15 T16 T17 T18 T19 T20 T21 T22 T23 T24 T25 Unlucky doctor
Fig. 5. Difference plot for unlucky doctor
When we look at the plot for the differences for each identified threat, two things become clear:  In three out of four cases, the threat "select wrong patient" is identified significantly more often using TMUC than using DMUC. The p-values are less than or equal to 0.01 for T11, T14 and T20.  In three out of four cases, the threat "wrong or missing update" is identified significantly more often using DMUC than using TMUC. The p-values are in all cases less than or equal to 0.03 for T13, T16 and T22.
In fig 6 we see that TMUC is better than DMUC in all cases but one. No system related information is shown in the use case diagrams. The observation thus confirms our results when we compared DMUC and FMEA -see [27] : use case diagrams will not help the developers to identify failure modes in the underlying computer system. 
Learning and using the methods
In order to answer RQ2 -is one of the two methods DMUC and TMUC easier to use -we used the TAM model [29] with the three factors Perceived ease of use (PEOU), Perceived usefulness (PU) and Intention to use (IU) -see Fig. 7 . The post-experiment questionnaire had four questions for each factor. Both the model and the questionnaire were the same as the ones used in the previous experiment
The answers were scored on a five point Likert scale. We have used t-tests to compare the scores given by the TMUC group and the DMUC group. Using a p-value of 0.10 we found that only two questions gave a significant difference -Q7 (I was never confused when using the method) and Q10 (The diagrams and tables were easy to draw). All in all, the small differences in item responses were as should be expected when there are no real differences. For PEOU we found the same score for Q1, DMUC was better than TMUC in two cases and TMUC was better than DMUC in one case. This pattern was repeated for ITU and PU. Based on the summary above it is reasonable to claim that there is no significant difference between DMUC and TMUC, neither for perceived ease of use, nor for intention to use or perceived usefulness. We will thus accept hypothesis H2 0 .
Discussions
We will start by restating our most important findings (1) persons using TMUC found more threats pertaining to the computer system, (2) persons using TMUC found more defects of the category "wrong patient" and (3) persons using DMUC found more defects of the category "wrong update".
For (1): the textual use cases have separate columns for system responses. This is partly due to the chosen pattern -see fig 3 - and partly due to the chosen lay-out of the textual use cases. Thus, the textual use cases bring the system into focus, while the use case diagrams do not even mention the system.
For (2): the textual use cases brings data control to the attention of the analyst since the selected use case pattern focuses on data control -see fig 3 .
For (3): textual use cases and use case diagrams give the same amount of information concerning the review activity. For the use case diagram, however, all focus is on the review activity while for the textual use cases it is one of many others.
For both (2) and (3) and partly for (1), the explanation can be summed up in one word: "focus" and focus is again created by the information available. As we see from the textual use case example, each textual use case starts with a check for the right patient -"is this the doctor's patient?" -more information, while the use case diagrams have all their focus on the review itself -e.g. "review treatment plan". Nothing else is even mentioned.
Thus, the focus decides the outcome -a method or representation will enable the analyst to identify more threats in the areas where the method helps him to focus. If we take this a step further we should consider using something like HazOp's guide words, which are also used to focus the analysis [30] . This has already been tried in small cases studies [28, 29] . The results from our experiments indicate that in our case, the words used in the text connected to a use case play the role of guide words, although in a rather unsystematic way.
Threats to validity
We will use the categories defined in [32] as a starting point for our discussion on threats to validity. We will look at each threat in a short section before giving a sumup of our validity claims.
Conclusion validity
Conclusion validity is concerned with our ability to draw the right conclusions about the relationship between the treatment and the outcome. An important question here is sample size. We will denote the type I error probability by  and the type II error probability by . The following relationship holds:
If we use  = 0.05 and  = 0.20, we get N = 26/ES 2 . We have N = 52, which gives us ES = 0.7.
For the number of identified failure modes, we found an effect size of 0.7, which is large enough. For the post-experiment questions, we found only two questions that showed any statistically significant differences between DMUC and TMUC. In both cases, however, the effect size was smaller than 0.7 -0.6 for both Q7 and Q10.
Internal validity
Internal validity is concerned with the relationship between treatment and outcomewas it the treatment that caused the outcome? The analysis reported in section 5.1 shows that using the method DMUC or TMUC explain the difference, while factors like UML experience and use case experience did not explain the observed differences in the number of failure modes identified. Thus, we are confident that it was the difference in analysis method that caused the observed differences in the number of failure modes identified.
For the post-experiment questionnaire, there are no combinations of preexperiment factors that can explain more than 25% of the variation in observed values for any of the post-experiment questions. The variation in experiment (DMUC vs. TMUC) can only explain the observed variations for two of these questions.
Construct validity
Construct validity is concerned with the relationship between theory and observations -was the experiment realistic? The realism of the experiment is lacking in two ways: (1) little training with a new method and (2) the quality of the result has no influence, neither on a real product nor on the participants' working situation. However, the above-mentioned threats will influence both groups in the same way. Since we are only looking for differences between two methods and not for any absolute measure of efficiency, this should not influence our conclusions of the two methods' relative merits.
External validity
External validity is concerned with generalization -where and when are the conclusions applicable and can we generalize from our experiments to industrial practice? The important problem here is whether we can generalize our results to the software industry. Experiments on defect detection performed by Runeson [33] found no significant difference between graduate students and professionals. As shown by [34] generalization is not a question of students vs. professional developers -it is mainly a question of level of competence. UML competence did not seem to influence the results. The only competence that could influence the results in a significant way is the domain competence -in our case competence related to hospital work and working with patient journals.
Our claims to validity
Based on the discussions above, we claim that there are no serious threats to validity for our conclusions on the number of identified failure modes -RQ1. For factors related to ease of use, we see problems related to conclusion validity due to the small effect sizes.
Conclusions and further work
Our main conclusions from this experiment are as follows:  A misuse case analysis based on textual use cases will produce more failure modes than a misuse case analysis based on use case diagrams. The main reason for this is that a textual use case contains more information which is used by the experiment participants to focus the analysis.  Usability, as defined from the TAM model, is the same for textual use cases and use case diagrams.
In order to follow up on the use of guide words in DMUC analysis, we will run a new experiment where DMUC using the use case diagrams only is compared to DMUC using use case diagrams and a set of guide words. In addition, an experiment where we compare DMUC using simple use cases to DMUC using quite elaborated use cases is already in its planning stage. 
